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Loss of Parental Consortium:
Why Kentucky Should Re-Recognize the Claim
Outside the Wrongful Death Context
Collin D. Schueler'
It is common knowledge that a parent who suffers serious physical or
mental injury is unable to give his minor children the parental care, training,
love and companionship in the same degree as he might have but for the
injury. Hence, it is difficult for the court, on the basis of natural justice, to
reach the conclusion that this type of action will not lie. Human tendencies
and sympathies suggest otherwise. Normal home life for a child consists of
complex incidences in which the sums constitute a nurturing environment.
When the vitally important parent-child relationship is impaired and the
child loses the love, guidance and close companionship of a parent, the
child is deprived of something that is indeed valuable and precious. No
one could seriously contend otherwise!
INTRODUCTION
G ENERALLY, the term "consortium" has been defined as "[t]he benefits
that one person . . . is entitled to receive from another, including
companionship, cooperation, affection, aid, [and] financial support."3
Under Kentucky law, "[e]ither a wife or husband may recover damages
against a third person for loss of consortium, resulting from a negligent or
wrongful act of such third person."'4 Furthermore, "[iln a wrongful death
action in which the decedent was a minor child, the surviving parent, or
parents, may recover for loss of affection and companionship that would
have been derived from such child during its minority.. . ."I Therefore,
it is clear that the state of Kentucky "recognizes loss of consortium claims
between husband and wife and the claim of a parent for the loss of the
child's affection and companionship upon the death of a child."
6
i J.D. expected 2010, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A., Political Science,
2oo6, University of Michigan. The author would like to thank his wife, parents, and family
for their support.
2 Hoffman v. Dautel, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (Kan. 1962).
3 BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 328 (8th ed. 2004).
4 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.145(2) (West 20o6).
5 Id. § 411-135.
6 Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Ky. 1997).
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In Giuliani v. Guiler, the Supreme Court of Kentucky added to this list
of consortium claims, recognizing a minor child's claim for loss of parental
consortium.7 In expanding the common law, however, the scope of the
court's decision was unclear. In Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., the
Kentucky Court of Appeals summarized the issue, noting that "[tihe
Giuliani opinion does not explicitly state whether the cause of action
approved was for wrongful death actions only, or whether the cause of
action is also available in cases, such as the present case, where the parent
is severely injured."' 8 After reviewing the context and language of Giuliani,
the Lambert court held that "the former interpretation of the opinion is the
sounder interpretation." 9
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals said that loss of parental
consortium claims are limited to "those cases where there is likewise an
action for the wrongful death of the parent,"' 0 it did not provide a complete
picture of the Kentucky Supreme Court's view of loss of parental consortium
claims. Specifically, the Lambert court failed to analyze several elements of
the majority opinion in Giuliani, which suggests a minor child can bring a
loss of parental consortium claim outside the context of a wrongful death
case." The Giuliani opinion, combined with extensive persuasive authority
and policy considerations, should prompt the Kentucky Supreme Court to
overrule Lambert and recognize a minor child's loss of parental consortium
claim even if his or her parent is only severely injured.
Part I of this Note reviews Kentucky's history of loss of parental
consortium claims. Part II examines the Kentucky Supreme Court's
decision in Giuliani, and Part III analyzes the Lambert court's narrow
reading of Giuliani. Part IV discusses the aspects of the Giuliani decision
that the Kentucky Court of Appeals failed to consider in Lambert. Part V
reflects on these considerations, evaluating persuasive authority and policy
considerations which point toward recognizing loss of parental consortium
claims outside the wrongful death context. Part VI briefly considers why
the law has yet to change, before concluding that the Kentucky Supreme
Court should allow a minor child to bring a loss of parental consortium
claim even if his or her parent is only severely injured.
7 Id. at 323.
8 Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., 37 S-W.3d 770, 780 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).
9 Id.; see also Clements v. Moore, 55 S.W.3d 838,839 n.3 (Ky. Ct. App. 2ooo) ("This Court
[has] rejected the argument that Giuliani can be interpreted as recognizing a minor's claim for
loss of parental consortium outside the wrongful death context.").
io Lambert, 37 S.W.3d at 780.
i i See Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 319; see also Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, Brown v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., No. 307CV00712, 2oo8 WL 4239645, at *z
(W.D. Ky. May 1, 2008).
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I. KENTUCKY'S THIN HISTORY OF Loss OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM CLAIMS
At early common law, Kentucky refused to recognize loss of consortium
claims outside the narrow context of a husband recovering damages for the
loss of his wife's companionship."2 As early as 1939, Kentucky's highest
court recognized "that a husband has such a right to his wife's services,
society and companionship that he may maintain an action for damages for
their impairment or loss resulting from the negligence or wrongful act of
a third person." 13 Yet through the 1960s, the same court held "that a wife
may not maintain an action to recover damages for loss or impairment of her
husband's consortium caused by negligence of another party."14 Finally, in
1970, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed course and held that "a wife
has a cause of action for loss of consortium of her husband resulting from
an injury to the husband due to the negligent act of another."'
Less than four months later, the Kentucky General Assembly codified
this rule, stating that either a husband or wife may recover loss of consortium
damages resulting from the negligent act of a third party.16 In that same
statutory provision, the legislature defined "consortium" as "the right to the
services, assistance, aid, society, companionship and conjugal relationship
between husband and wife, or wife and husband."' 7 It seemed appropriate
for "consortium" to be defined in the context of husbands and wives, since
Kentucky's legislature and courts were silent on whether a child could
successfully sue for loss of parental consortium. This silence was broken in
the 1977 Kentucky Supreme Court decision of Brooks v. Burkeen.' s
In Brooks, Samuel Childers and Donald Childers, the minor children of
the deceased Luegean Childers, pursued loss of consortium claims after
their father died as a result of the alleged negligence of his employer and
the employer's foreman.' 9 In just two sentences, the court rejected the
children's claims, holding that they "fail because no court or legislature in
the United States has yet seen fit to recognize such an action. We decline
the opportunity to be the first to do so."" In the decades following the
court's decision in Brooks, however, "at least fifteen jurisdictions ...
12 Baird v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. R.R. Co., 368 S.W.zd 172, 174 (Ky.
1963).
13 Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 126 S.W.zd 143, 146 (Ky. 1939).
14 Baird, 368 S.W.2d at 172; see also Cravens v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 242 S.W.
628, 632 (Ky. 1922); La Eace v. Cincinnati, Newport & Covington Ry. Co., 249 S.W.zd 534,
534 (Ky. 1952).
15 Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.Wzd 41I,412 (Ky. 1970).
16 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.145(2) (West 2oo6).
17 § 4111.45(1).
18 Brooks v. Burkeen, 549 S.W.zd 91 (Ky. 1977).
19 Id. at 92.
20 Id. (citation omitted).
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validated a child's action for loss of parental consortium or guidance."',
Nevertheless, in 1995, the Kentucky Supreme Court reaffirmed the Brooks
ruling in Adams v. Miller."2
In Adams, a minor child's mother tragically died in a fire as a result of the
alleged negligence of his mother's landlord; the minor sought damages for
loss of parental consortium. 23 The court recognized that Section 411.135
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which was enacted in 1968, "gives a
surviving parent a cause of action for the loss of affection of a minor
child. '2 4 Nevertheless, the court refused to recognize the inverse-a claim
by a surviving minor child for the loss of affection of a parent.25 In his
dissent, Justice Wintersheimer acknowledged that the court's reason for not
recognizing the loss of parental consortium claims in Brooks-that Kentucky
would be the only jurisdiction to recognize such a claim-was no longer
accurate. 6 Moreover, Justice Wintersheimer stated that "[r]ecognizing a
claim for loss of parental consortium is the only appropriate progression of
Kentucky law and is in harmony with the public policy objectives behind
allowing claims for loss of consortium." 7 Therefore, although the majority
in Adams affirmed the court's holding in Brooks, Justice Wintersheimer's
dissent illustrated a split in the court over whether children should be able
to pursue loss of parental consortium claims in Kentucky.'8
Furthermore, Justice Wintersheimer's dissent foreshadowed another
important question: assuming Kentucky did recognize loss of parental
consortium claims, could children raise such claims only in wrongful death
cases, as was the case in Brooks and Adams, or could a child recover for loss
of parental consortium where his or her parent is only severely injured? 9
Justice Wintersheimer held the latter view, saying it would be a "logical step
... for Kentucky to provide children a claim for relief when their parent is
severely injured."30 Less than two years later, Justice Wintersheimer wrote
the majority opinion in Giuliani v. Guiler, unequivocally recognizing loss of
parental consortium claims.3 Despite his seemingly clear dissent in Adams,
21 13 DAVID J. LEIBSON, KENTUCKY PRACTICE § 20:4, at 939 (zd ed. 2oo8); see also Giuliani
v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318,319 (Ky. 1997) ("Since 1977, when Brooks was decided, 15 courts and
two state legislatures have recognized the claim of children for loss of parental consortium.").
22 Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.zd 112, I16 (Ky. 1995).
23 Id. at I 13-14.
24 Id. at i16 (citing Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (West zoo6)).
25 Id.
26 See id. at 117 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting); see also 13 LEIBSON, supra note 2 1, § 20:4,
at 939 (highlighting this same point made by Justice Wintersheimer).
27 Adams, 908 S.W.2d at 117 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
28 Id.
29 Seeid. at Ii8.
30 Id.
31 Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1997).
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however, Justice Wintersheimer's opinion in Giuliani did not clearly state
"whether a child may recover for their [sic] loss of parental consortium of
an injured, but not deceased, parent,"3 opening up a Pandora's box of debate.
II. Giuliirn v. GUILER: AN (AMBIGUOUS) EVOLUTION IN THE LAW
33
In Giuliani, Mary Giuliani tragically "suffered a cardiac and respiratory
collapse" and died shortly after giving birth to her fourth child.' Mrs.
Giuliani's other children were nine, seven, and three years old.35 In addition
to filing a wrongful death claim against Mrs. Giuliani's obstetrician (among
others), the father of the four children filed loss of consortium claims as
next friend for each child.36 The trial court dismissed the loss of parental
consortium claims in a summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed,
citing Brooks as controlling authority.37 In affirming the trial court's decision,
the appellate court encouraged the Kentucky Supreme Court "to revisit
this issue in the light of modern developments in this area of the law."
'3
The supreme court agreed to do so, accepting discretionary review.
39
Justice Wintersheimer wrote the opinion for the majority of the
court, and he explicitly held that "Kentucky recognizes the claim of
minor children for loss of parental consortium." 40 Justice Wintersheimer
echoed his dissenting opinion from Adams, stating that Kentucky should
allow children to recover for loss of parental consortium damages caused
by the negligent acts of third parties.4' To support his holding, Justice
Wintersheimer acknowledged that
[t]he loss of consortium is a judge-made common law doctrine which this
Court has the power and duty to modify and conform to the changing
conditions of our society. When the common law is out of step with the
times, this Court has a responsibility to change that law. Development of
the common law is a judicial function and should not be confused with the
expression of public policy by the legislature.
32 Susanne Cetrulo, A Practitioner's Analysis of the Loss of Parental Consortium in Kentucky,
26 N. Ky. L. REV. i, io (999) (emphasis added).
33 For a more extensive discussion of the Giuliani decision, see Jamie M. Ramsey, Note,
Giuliani v. Guiler: Stealing the GeneralAssembly's Thunder, 25 N. Ky. L. REv. 445 (1998).
34 Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 318-19.
35 Id. at 318.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 319.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 323.
41 Id. at 319; see also Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d 1lz, 117 (Ky. 1995) (Wintersheimer, J.,
dissenting).
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... It is a natural development of the common law to recognize the
need for a remedy for those children who lose the love and affection of their
parents due to the negligence of another.
•.. [I]t is long overdue that we recognize the essential personhood of
each individual while giving homage and deference to their inclusion in the
family."2
In making its decision, the court expressly overruled Brooks and Adams,
rejecting "the view that children do not have identity as individuals and as
members of the family separate from their parents." 43
The court's holding in Giuliani-that Kentucky now recognizes a
minor child's claim for loss of parental consortium44-initially sparked a
discussion over whether the court overstepped its authority by developing
this common law cause of action.45 As the dust continued to settle on
Giuliani, however, legal scholars recognized another important question
left unanswered by the court's decision-does a minor child have a cause
of action for loss of parental consortium if his or her parent is only severely
injured?6
After the decision, practitioner Susanne Cetrulo recognized that
"[uinder the specific facts of the Giuliani case, defendants can easily argue
that a claim for loss of parental consortium would be limited to children
whose parents were killed and entitled to file a wrongful death action.
' '41
That being said, Cetrulo recognized that "plaintiffs maintain that the logic
of this decision would easily apply to allow recovery for the serious personal
injury of a parent."4 Hence, there appeared to be two ways to read the
majority's opinion in Giuliani.49 Cetrulo foreshadowed the future of this
debate precisely, asking "[w]hat lies ahead from the appellate courts as to
recovery for the loss of services of a severely-injured parent?" 0 Less than
one year later, the Kentucky Court of Appeals gave its answer to Cetrulo's
question in Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co."'
42 Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 319-20.
43 Id. at 320.
44 Id. at 323.
45 See, e.g., id. at 326 (Cooper, J., dissenting) ("[I]n this case, we [the court] illegitimately
usurp the province of the legislature .... "); see also Ramsey, supra note 33, at 47 1 ("[T]he su-
preme court, in recognizing this cause of action, has exceeded its jurisdiction.").
46 See, e.g., Cetrulo, supra note 32, at 10-14.
47 Id. at I .
48 Id.
49 Seeid.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
51 Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., 37 S-W.3 d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. zooo).
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III. LAmBERT v. FRANKLIN REAL ESTATE Co.: A (Too?)
NARROw READING OF GIULIANI
In Lambert, Donald Lambert, John Durman, and Carl Marshall were
trying to repair a water well when a pipe they raised in the air "came into
contact, or into extremely close proximity, with a 7,200-volt electric power
line . . . killing Lambert and Durman, and severely injuring Marshall.""2
Marshall and the estates of Lambert and Durman filed negligence actions
against various defendants, and the children of each victim filed claims for
loss of parental consortium. 3
Regarding the loss of parental consortium claims brought by the
three minor children of Carl Marshall, the court began by citing Giuliani
and its holding that "a surviving child may file a claim for loss of parental
consortium." 4 Then, the court in Lambert recognized that the Giuliani
opinion did not say whether loss of parental consortium claims were limited
to wrongful death actions, or could also be brought in cases in which a parent
is severely injured. 5 After parsing the language of Justice Wintersheimer's
majority opinion in Giuliani, however, the Lambert court provided at least
three reasons in support of the former interpretation
6
First, the Lambert court quoted Justice Wintersheimer's opinion in
Giuliani, where he stated "tt]he claim of loss of parental consortium is a
reciprocal of the claim of the parents for loss of a child's consortium which
was recognized in KRS 411.135."" 7 The court reasoned that since "KRS
411.135 provides a parent with a loss of consortium claim for the loss of
a minor child only in wrongful death actions[,] ... the 'reciprocal' of KRS
411.135 would appear to be limited to wrongful death cases."5 8 Likewise,
the Lambertcourt quoted the Giulianicourt's tatement that it was persuaded
by the suggestion that "there is no legal distinction between the claim of
a parent for loss of a child's consortium from the claim of a child for the
loss of a parent's consortium." 9 The court said this statement "limits the
child's claim to those situations in which the parent would have a cause of
action."'  In light of Section 411.135 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes,
52 Id. at 774.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 779-80.
55 Id. at 78o.
56 See Id.; see also Brown v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., No. 3:o7CV-712-R, zoo8 WL
2224881, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 27, 2oo8) (mem.) (providing a similar discussion of the reasons
provided by the Lambert court).
57 Lambert, 37 S.W.3d at 78o (quoting Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318,321 (Ky. I997));
see also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (West 2oo6).
58 Lambert, 37 S.W.3d at 78o.
59 Id. (quoting Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 321).
6o Id.
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the Lambert court concluded that "if there is no legal distinction between
the two causes of action, then the cause of action for the loss of parental
consortium should likewise be limited to cases involving the wrongful
death of the parent."'"
Second, the Lambert court noted that in Giuliani, Mary Giuliani died
while giving birth to her fourth child. 6 Thus, the court concluded that
since "Giuliani was a wrongful death case ... it was within a wrongful death
context that the Supreme Court approved loss of parental consortium. '63 In
addition, the Lambert court pointed out that the Giuliani decision overruled
Brooks and Adams, "cases which denied loss of parental consortium in cases
of wrongful death," rather than in situations in which a parent was only
severely injured. 64 These factors suggested to the appellate court that the
holding in Giuliani was limited to wrongful death actions .
6
1
Finally, the Lambert court pointed to two statements by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Giuliani to infer that it intended to limit loss of
parental consortium claims to wrongful death situations. 66 First, Justice
Wintersheimer stated that "[t]he loss of parental consortium is simply
another factor to be considered in reaching a fair and equitable conclusion
to any constitutionally protected wrongful death claim. '67 Second, he said
that "[t]he proof of such loss [of parental consortium] and the necessary
proof of monetary loss resulting therefrom are factors to be considered by
the trier of fact separate from any wrongful death claim pursued under the
wrongful death statute."
68
For the foregoing reasons and "the absence of a direct holding that the
loss of parental consortium is available beyond wrongful death cases, ' 69 the
court in Lambert concluded that "Giuliani is best read as providing a cause
of action to a child only in those cases where there is likewise an action for
the wrongful death of the parent."70 Since this was not the case in Lambert,
the court dismissed the loss of parental consortium claims brought by Carl
Marshall's three minor children.7
The Lambert court's analysis of the Giuliani opinion is in line with at least
one potential reading of that decision. Susanne Cetrulo noted that since
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 Id. (quoting Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318,322 (Ky. 1997)).
68 Id. (quoting Giuliani, 951 S.W.zd at 323).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Cetrulo, supra note 32, at 10-14.
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the Kentucky Supreme Court cited and analyzed Kentucky's wrongful
death statute throughout its analysis of loss of parental consortium claims,
"[iut would seem ... that the Giuliani court has only recognized recovery for
this claim where a parent has died."73 Still, Cetrulo recognized that "[tihis
apparent limitation within the Giuliani decision ... has not prohibited filings
throughout the Commonwealth for loss of parental consortium on behalf
of children whose parents merely have been injured."7 4 Thus, as Cetrulo
suggested, there are multiple ways of reading Giuliani.7" In Lambert, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals read Giuliani narrowly-perhaps too narrowly.
After reviewing the Giuliani opinion, it is clear that the Lambert court
does not provide a complete picture of the Kentucky Supreme Court's
view of loss of parental consortium claims. This Note does not dispute the
accuracy of the appellate court's analysis of Giuliani. Rather, it highlights
several elements of Justice Wintersheimer's opinion that suggest a minor
child can bring a loss of parental consortium claim outside the context of
a wrongful death case 76 -all of which the Lambert court failed to analyze.
In light of these statements, and extensive persuasive authority and
policy considerations, the Kentucky Supreme Court should not follow the
holding in Lambert. Instead, Kentucky should recognize a minor child's
loss of parental consortium claim even if his or her parent is only severely
injured.
IV. WHAT THE LAMBERT COURT DID NOT SEE: ANOTHER LOOK AT GiuLmvI
To support its position that the Kentucky Supreme Court intended to
limit loss of parental consortium claims to the wrongful death context, the
Lambert court cites Justice Wintersheimer's statement that a loss of parental
consortium claim is a reciprocal of Section 411.135 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes.77 Section 411.135 allows the surviving parent, or parents,
of a deceased minor child to recover for loss of the child's affection and
companionship.7" Likewise, the Lambert court notes that the Giuliani court
viewed a parent's claim for loss of a minor child's consortium as being
similar to a minor child's claim for loss of parental consortium.7 9 Yet, as one
practitioner points out, "the Court in Giuliani relied upon further factors
which would seem to support the claim [of loss of parental consortium]
73 Id. at ii.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 See id.
76 See Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 319-20 (Ky. 1997); see also Plaintiff's Response
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1 i, at *2-3.
77 Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., 37 S-W-3d 770, 780 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).
78 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (West 2oo6).
79 See Lambert, 37 S.W.3d at 780.
2000--20101
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existing outside a wrongful death action.""° In particular, the Giuliani court
said:
Given the legislatively expressed public policy of this Commonwealth
to strengthen and encourage the family for the protection and care of
children, [as stated in Section 600.010 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes], it
is only logical to recognize that children have a right to be compensated for
their losses when such harm has been caused to them by the wrongdoing
of another. It is the purpose of all tort law to compensate one for the harm
caused by another and to deter future wrongdoing. Loss of consortium is a
common law cause of action. Common law grows and develops and must be
adapted to meet the recognized importance of the family, and the necessity
for protection by the law of the right of a child to a parent's love, care and
protection so as to provide for the complete development of that child 1
In light of this position by Justice Wintersheimer, it has been argued
that "[a]s in a claim for the wrongful death of a parent, children whose
parent or parents suffer sufficiently severe, permanent, and debilitating
injuries . . . effectively lose their right to this love, care, and protection.""2
Simply and eloquently put, "[i]f this loss occurs, a child's right to recover
for this loss should not depend on whether or not the parent's life was
fully extinguished." 83 Stated another way, "[i]f a parent, due to a serious
physical injury, is unable to provide parental services of financial support,
training, parental attention, and society, then the child's claim should be as
valuable, or more so, than if the parent is deceased." 84 There is additional
evidence in the supreme court's opinion in Giuliani to indicate that Justice
Wintersheimer would agree with this position.
In Giuliani, Justice Wintersheimer quoted his dissent in Adams, where
he stated that "[tihe injury in a loss of parental consortium claim is no more
remote than the injury in a spouse's cause of action for loss of consortium,
which Kentucky already recognizes."" In 1970, Kentucky's highest state
court held that "a wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium of her
husband resulting from an injury to the husband due to the negligent act
of another."16 Therefore, as Susanne Cetrulo points out in her article, if a
loss of consortium claim is "available to children in the same means and
8o Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1!, at 2.
8i Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 320 (citations omitted); see also Plaintiff's Response to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note i , at *2.
82 Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note i I, at *z.
83 Id.
84 Cetrulo, supra note 32, at 12.
85 Giuliani, 951 S.W.zd at 322 (quoting Adams v. Miller, 9o8 S.W.zd 112, 119 (Ky. 1995)
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting)).
86 Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W2d 411, 412 (Ky. 1970) (emphasis added).
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manner in which it is available to adults," and "the loss of consortium of a
spouse has not been limited to a wrongful death scenario," then it is logical
to conclude that loss of parental consortium should likewise not be limited
to wrongful death cases.8 7 Justice Wintersheimer appeared to endorse this
position when he stated that "[elven though a wrongful death action and
a loss of consortium claim may arise from the same injury, they belong to
separate legal entities and consequently should not be treated as a single
claim."'
Finally, the Giuliani court cited fifteen cases and two state statutes to
bolster its view that Kentucky should recognize loss of parental consortium
claims generally.8 9 Twelve of the fifteen cases cited by the court involved
loss of parental consortium claims outside the wrongful death context.'
This further implies that the Giuliani court intended to recognize loss of
parental consortium claims when a parent is only severely injured.91
Despite the foregoing analysis, the Lambert court was correct in saying
"[t]he Giuliani opinion does not explicitly state whether the cause of action
approved was for wrongful death actions only, or whether the cause of
action is also available in cases ... where the parent is severely injured.""
Clearly, the Giuliani opinion could be read in multiple ways; even if Justice
Wintersheimer's seemingly contradictory statements lean more toward
limiting loss of parental consortium claims to the wrongful death context,
the existence of extensive persuasive authority and policy considerations
suggest that the Kentucky Supreme Court should recognize a minor child's
claim for loss of parental consortium when his or her parent is only severely
injured.
87 Cetrulo, supra note 32, at i i.
88 Giuliani, 951 S.W.zd at 322 (emphasis added).
89 See id. at 319-20.
90 See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc. 734 P.zd 99i, 99! (Alaska 1987); Villareal
v. State, 774 P.2d 213, 215 (Ariz. 1989); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. 199o);
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.ad 690, 695 (Mass. I98O); Berger v. Weber,
303 N.W.2d 424, 424 (Mich. 198i); Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429, 430 (Mont. 1991); Williams v.
Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Okla. 199o); Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 496 A.zd 939,940 (Vt.
1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 19o, 19I (Wash. 1984); Belcher v. Goins, 400
S.E.zd 830, 833 (W. Va. I99O); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 513 (Wis. 1984);
Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.zd 117I, 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
9i See Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note I i, at *2-3.
92 Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., 37 S.W.3d 770, 780 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).
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V. PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY AND PUBLIC POLICY:
ADVOCATING FOR THE RECOGNITION OF Loss OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM
CLAIMS OUTSIDE THE WRONGFUL DEATH CONTEXT
93
A. Justice Wintersheimer' Prior Writings
Since Justice Wintersheimer's majority opinion in Giuliani is ambiguous,
the most persuasive authority for understanding the meaning behind his
words would arguably be his own prior writings on the subject of loss of
parental consortium. In Giuliani, Justice Wintersheimer quoted his dissent
in Adams. 91 However, he failed to quote the critical words that would have
almost certainly resolved this controversy. In Adams, Justice Wintersheimer
acknowledged that a child's interest in "proper parental care and affection"
is hindered when a parent is injured by the negligence of a third party, but
noted that "there was no protection given to the child for loss of society,
guidance, and attention that resulted from cases ofparentalinjury."9 Justice
Wintersheimer then stated:
Kentucky has recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium in
favor of spouses. We have also held that parents have an independent cause
of action for loss of services and other pecuniary damages resulting from
negligent injuries to their minor children. Thus, the next logical step is for
Kentucky to provide children a claim for relief when their parent is severely injured.
When such recovery is allowed to other, equally significant family members,
there is no reason to deprive children of compensation for loss of their
parent's love and affection, while allowing a parent or a spouse to recover.
6
Therefore, any remaining questions from Giuliani about Justice
Wintersheimer's position on loss of parental consortium claims appear
resolved in light of his dissenting opinion in Adams. Although these
statements are not binding law, they should persuade the Kentucky
Supreme Court to recognize a minor child's claim for loss of parental
consortium when his or her parent is only severely injured.
Beyond his own views of loss of parental consortium, Justice
Wintersheimer said in Giuliani that"[w]hen the common law is out of step
with the times, this Court has a responsibility to conform the common
93 See also Bruce Gehle, Note, Loss of Consortium: Kentucky Should No Longer Prohibit a
Child's Claim for Loss of Parental Consortium Due to the Negligent Act of a Third Pay, 84 Ky. L.J.
173, 192-95 (1996) (discussing policy considerations supporting a claim for loss of parental
consortium).
94 Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 322 (quoting Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d I12, 118-19 (Ky.
1995) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting)).
95 Adams, 908 S.W.2d at 1I8 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
96 Id. (emphasis added).
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law."97 Therefore, even if the Supreme Court of Kentucky believes that
the Lambert court's interpretation of Giuliani is convincing, it should look to
persuasive authority to determine whether Kentucky's position on loss of
parental consortium is in line with societal trends.
B. Persuasive Case Law
There appears to be a clear trend in the law toward recognizing loss
of parental consortium claims when the parent is only severely injured.98
Although no such causes of action existed at early common law,"
approximately nine states recognized the claim by 1990,"' and in 1997,
when Giuliani was decided, at least twelve jurisdictions recognized the
claim.' 10 Within those twelve jurisdictions, three landmark cases prove
particularly illustrative and persuasive.
First, in 1981, the Supreme Court of Michigan heard a case involving a
loss of parental consortium claim. 02 Bergerv. Weber involved an automobile
accident in which the plaintiff's spouse survived, but suffered permanent
injuries 03 In addition to bringing a negligence claim, the plaintiff sought
damages for loss of parental consortium on his minor daughter's behalf.1' 4
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as
to the issue of the minor daughter's loss of parental consortium; however,
the appellate court reversed, prompting the defendants to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Michigan. 05
The court argued that "the real anomaly is to allow a child's recovery for
the loss of a parent's society and companionship when the loss attends the
parent's death but to deny such recovery when the loss attends the parent's
injury."' 6 Then, in a stunning display of candor, the court said plainly:
"Convinced that we have too long treated the child as second-class citizen
or some sort of nonperson, we feel constrained to remove the disability
we have imposed."'0 7 The court ultimately held that a minor child may
bring a loss of parental consortium claim even if his or her parent is only
97 Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 321.
98 Elizabeth Williams, Cause of Action by Child for Loss of Parent's Consortium, in 12 CAUSES
OF ACTION 2D 419 § 4, at 428 (1999); see also Gehle, supra note 93, at 173.
99 See Williams, supra note 98, § 4, at 427.
1oo Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.zd 830, 836 (W. Va. 199o).
tot See cases cited supra note 9o .
102 See Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 198 1).
103 Id. at 424.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 424-25.
io6 Id. at 426.
107 Id. at 427.
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injured.108
Second, in 1984, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was confronted with
the same issue."'° Theama v. City of Kenosha involved a tragic motorcycle
accident."' In June of 1978, Robert Theama was severely injured when his
motorcycle allegedly hit a deep pothole, throwing him from his vehicle.",
Theama claimed that the accident, which occurred late at night, resulted
from the City of Kenosha's failure to adequately light the roadway."'
Theama sought damages for his injuries, and his two minor children,
Tracy and Terry Theama, brought claims "for the loss of the care, society,
companionship, protection, training, and guidance of their father because
of his extensive injuries.""' The trial court dismissed the loss of parental
consortium claims, and the appellate court affirmed.
1 1 4
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, acknowledging three key
points. First, the court recognized the significance of "the family unit in
our society.""' Second, the court accepted the contemporary view that
children merit special protection by the judicial branch." 6 Third, the court
acknowledged "the necessity of the parent's love, care, education and
protection in contributing to the wholesome and complete development
of the child.""' 7 The court used each of these to justify its holding that a
minor child could bring a claim for loss of parental consortium even if his or
her parent is only severely injured." 8
Third, in 1990, the Supreme Court of Texas was given its opportunity
to decide this issue." 9 Reagan v. Vaughn involved a fight in the parking lot
of a Texas saloon. l 0 David Reagan, a patron of the saloon, was in a fight
with another patron when "the manager of the bar, Vaughn, struck Reagan
on the head with a baseball bat."'' Reagan was permanently disabled
from the blow and was left to function at the level of a young child.'
Reagan sued Vaughn and the owners of the saloon, seeking damages for
io8 See id.
xo9 Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.zd 513, 514 (Wis. 1984).
1o Id. at513.
i i Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 514.
115 Id. at 518.
116 Seeid. at 514-18.
117 Id. at518.
1I8 Seeid.at58-I9.
119 Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.Wzd 463 (Tex. i99o).
120 Id. at 464.
121 Id.
122 See id.
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his injuries." 3 Reagan's minor daughter, Julia, sought damages for loss of
parental consortium."2 4 At trial, the jury awarded damages to both Reagan
and Julia; however, the appellate court reversed the loss of parental
consortium damages.' The Supreme Court of Texas agreed to hear Julia's
appeal because this was a case of first impression.
2 6
To reach its decision, the court conducted a step-by-step logical review
of its prior case law. 7 First, the court recognized that just as "the death of a
child inflicts upon his parents a loss of love, advice, comfort, companionship
and society," "2 the death of a parent inflicts an equivalent loss upon a child.' 9
Second, the court "acknowledged that [a] nonfatal injury to a spouse can
result in a real, direct, and personal loss to the other spouse."' Then,
the court concluded that it "would be hard pressed to say that a serious,
permanent and disabling injury to a parent does not potentially visit upon
the child an equally serious deprivation."'' The court ultimately joined
Michigan and Wisconsin and held that a minor child could bring a claim
for loss of parental consortium even if his or her parent is only severely
injured.32
C. Persuasive Commentary
A few commentators "applaud the majority rule denying a claim for lost
or impaired parental consortium in a non-fatal injury case."' 33 Nevertheless,
most scholars stalwartly support such a claim 34 For example, as early as
1916, Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School disagreed with the
common law approach which denied loss of parental consortium claims
when the parent survived. 31 Specifically, Dean Pound wrote:
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id. ("This court has never addressed the issue of whether a child may recover
damages for the loss of parental companionship, love, and society when a parent is injured.").
127 See id. at 465-66.
128 Id. at 465 (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983)).
129 See id. (citing Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.
1985), abrogated by Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507
(Tex. 1998)).
130 Id. at 465-66 (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.Wzd 665, 667 (Tex. 1978)).
131 Id. at 466.
132 See id:
133 Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 83o , 835 n.5 (W. Va. i99o).
134 See id. at 836.
135 See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICn. L. REV. 177,
185-86 (1916); see also Goins, 4o0 S.E.2d at 836.
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As against the world at large a child has an interest .... in the society
and affection of the parent.... [blut the law has done little to secure these
interests.
It will have been observed that legal securing of the interests of children
falls far short of what general considerations would appear to demand.
136
Over fifty years later, Dean William Prosser of the University of California at
Berkeley School of Law 3' agreed, arguing that a child who loses a parent's
"care, companionship and education" suffers "a genuine injury, and a
serious one."' 38 Another writer urged courts to recognize loss of parental
consortium claims when the parent is only severely injured, saying "[clourts
cannot abdicate their role as arbiters of justice merely because recognition
of a new cause of action would involve administrative difficulties .... A
child who has been deprived of the care and companionship of a parent...
is entitled to compensation from the wrongdoer."' 39 This view represents
an emerging trend.140
In contrast to this position, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 707A
provides the majority position: "One who by reason of his tortious conduct
is liable to a parent for illness or other bodily harm is not liable to a minor
child for resulting loss of parental support and care."' 4' Nevertheless, it has
been noted that this "position pre-dated all of the minority-view cases."
4
1
In addition, as the Supreme Court of Oregon acknowledged, the rule was
adopted "with some reluctance on the part of several of the drafting group,
and under compulsion of the case law [failing to recognize the cause of
action].' 143 Specifically, in the hearings behind Section 707A, Dean Prosser
said:
Well, I gather that nobody wants to reverse the position of 707A and
allow the child to recover for loss of the equivalent of consortium when the
father or mother is personally injured. One federal case in Hawaii did that
136 Pound, supra note 135, at 185-86; see also Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d
513, 518 n.5 (quoting the same statement from Pound).
137 See Berkeley Law-History, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/i38.htm (last visited Jan.
24, 2010).
138 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 896(4th ed. 1971); see
also Theama, 344 N.Wzd at 516 (quoting PRossER, supra § 125, at 896).
139 Elaine Tabor McParland, Note, Ipock v. Gilmore: Norh Carolina's Refusal to Extend
Recovery to the Infant Secondary Tort Victim, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1337, 1348 (1988).
140 See Goins, 400 S.E.2d at 835-36.
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 707A (1976) (emphasis added).
142 Goins, 400 SE.2d at 835.
143 Norwest ex rel. Crain v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 319-20
(Or. 1982) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 707A (Tentative Draft No. 14, 1969)).
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once, and presently got reversed when the state law changed, and all of
the cases have refused to allow recovery, so we would have no case support
whatever for taking the position that the action would lie.
I don't hear any voices uplifted in favor of reversing 707A, so I would
assume that it is approved, and proceed."44
Therefore, the Restatement's position does not provide much support for
those seeking to limit loss of parental consortium actions to the wrongful
death context.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has identified a
number of justifications other courts have used in refusing to recognize
loss of parental consortium claims outside the wrongful death context.'45
These include the notion that courts should defer to their state legislatures,
the risks of double recovery, increased liability insurance costs, and the
difficulty of assessing the amount of damages, among others. 146  Just
as the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found these reasons
unconvincing, 147 Justice Wintersheimer's opinion in Giuliani found them
equally unpersuasive.1
48
Justice Wintersheimer expressly stated that "[riecognition of loss of
consortium as a proper development of the common law does not invade
the province of the legislature to determine public policy questions.'
1 49
While this claim has been strongly criticized,5 0 the majority in Giuliani is
unequivocal regarding its position: "It is indeed not the province of the
legislature to develop the common law." "I Furthermore, the Giuliani court
specifically rejected outright the risks of double recovery, rising insurance
costs, and difficulty of assessing the amount of damages as reasons for
not recognizing loss of parental consortium claims generally.' Since the
Giuliani court has rejected the foregoing arguments, the Kentucky Supreme
Court should fall in line with West Virginia and "conclude[] that each of the
above reasons offered for not recognizing a parental consortium claim in a
nonfatal injury case is without merit." ''
144 Norwest, 65z P.2d at 320 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 707A
(Proceedings, 1969)).
145 Coins, 400 S.E.2d at 837.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.zd 318, 321-23 (Ky. 1997).
149 Id. at 321.
150 See, e.g., id. at 323-26 (Cooper, J., dissenting); Ramsey, supra note 33, at 456-68.
151 Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 3 21.
152 Id. at 322.
153 Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.zd 830, 840 (W. Va. 199o) (emphasis added).
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VI. A BRIEF REFLECTION ON WHY THE LAW HAS NOT CHANGED
A. Falling Victim to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
Recently, the United States District Courts in Kentucky heard several
cases involving claims for loss of parental consortium."s  In each case,
the courts adhered to the decision in Lambert, refusing to recognize loss
of parental consortium claims outside the wrongful death context."' 5 Of
course, their justification relied on the landmark case of Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, where the United States Supreme Court held that in a federal
diversity case, "the law to be applied ... is the law of the state" in which the
federal court sits." 6 In October 2006, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky summarized the issue when it recognized
that "in diversity cases ... [the court] must apply the law of the state's
highest court. Further, when the state's highest court has not decided the
applicable law, the court must attempt to ascertain it 'from all relevant
data.' Such 'relevant data' includes the state's appellate court decisions."' s
Thus, many plaintiffs pursuing loss of parental consortium claims have
fallen victim to diversity jurisdiction.
B. Stare Decisis
An unpublished decision from the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 2004
illustrates a similar problem facing plaintiffs.158 Hall ex rel. Perry v. Hunt
involved a medical malpractice case." 9 After falling down a flight of stairs
and injuring her wrist, Jennifer Hall sought medical treatment from Dr.
Daniel Hunt."6 According to Hall, Dr. Hunt was negligent in his diagnosis
and treatment, leaving "her permanently disabled and in constant pain."
1 61
In addition to filing her cause of action for medical malpractice, Hall's
minor son, Logan Perry, filed a claim for "loss of parental consortium due to
the loss of his mother's affection, services, companionship, and assistance
154 See Brown v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., No. 3:o7CV-712-R, 2oo8 WL 2224881
(W.D. Ky. May 27, 2008) (mem.); Ferguson v. Aventis Pasteur Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 755 (E.D.
Ky. 2006); Brown v. John Deere Co., No. 6:o6-429-DCR, 2oo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76289 (E.D.
Ky. Oct. 19, 2006) (mem.).
155 See Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., zoo8 WL 2224881, at *3; Ferguson, 444 F. Supp. 2d at
761; John Deere Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76289, at * 1-3.
156 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
157 John Deere Co., zoo6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76289, at *2-3 (citations omitted).
158 See Hall ex rel. Perry v. Hunt, No. 2oo3 -CA-oo0916-MR, 2oo4 WL 21926o5 (Ky. Ct.
App. Oct. 1, 2004).
159 Id. at *'.
i6o Id.
161 Id.
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for the remainder of his life."' 62 The trial court, citing the court of appeals
decision in Lambert, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss Logan's
claim.' 63 The court of appeals affirmed, saying
[the plaintiff] urges us to reject the holding in Lambert because the
Lambert Court misinterpreted prior case law on the issue and because public
policy dictates a contrary interpretation. The doctrine of stare decisis
mandates that courts must follow controlling case law if the relevant facts
are the same or similar. In the present case, the salient facts are the same as
in Lambert-the parent was injured and the child seeks to recover for loss
of consortium with that parent due to the injury. Accordingly, we are bound
by the holding in Lambert.'64
Unfortunately for Logan, the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied
discretionary review.'6 Since the court of appeals does not seem interested
in overturning its own decision in Lambert, plaintiffs must wait until the
Supreme Court of Kentucky decides this issue.
CONCLUSION
In 1997, the Kentucky Supreme Court answered the call to recognize
loss of parental consortium claims.'66 Unfortunately, Justice Wintersheimer's
majority opinion did not unequivocally "decide[] whether a loss of parental
consortium claim is available beyond wrongful death cases." ,67 Despite the
Lambert court's narrow reading of Giuliani, there is significant evidence in
the language of the opinion suggesting the court intended to recognize loss
of parental consortium claims even when a parent is only severely injured.
168
This evidence, in conjunction with persuasive authority and public policy,
should lead the Kentucky Supreme Court toward recognition of a minor
child's loss of parental consortium claim even if his or her parent is only
severely injured. As one court stated, "it would be contrary to justice to
deny the gravity of harm suffered by a child who is deprived of his or her
I62 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. (citation omitted).
i65 See id.
166 Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.ad 318, 323 (Ky. 1997) (mem.); see also Gehle, supra note
93, at 174-75 (calling on the Kentucky Supreme Court to recognize the claim for loss of pa-
rental consortium).
167 Brown v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., No. 3 :o7 CV- 7 12-R, 2008 WL 2224881, at *3
(W.D. Ky. May 27, 2008).
168 Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 320; see also Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, supra note i i, at *z.
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parent's society and companionship due to another's negligence." 16 9
169 Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W2d 513,518 (Wis. 1984).
